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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF' "'l!E S'l'ATE OF U"'AH
M1ERICAN COAL CO., EMERY MINING
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,

CORP, ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 19134

TERRY W. SANDSTROM, INDUSTRIAL
COM1'1ISSION OF UTAH, and SECOND
INJURY FUND,
Defendant-Respondent.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF CASE
ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs State Insurance Fund and American Coal Comoany
brought this appeal to determine whether the 1981 amendments
to Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69, allow an emoloyer anc'. its compensation
carrier to recoup sums expended for temporary total compensation
and medical benefits expended prior to an applicant's stabilization
but attributable to pre-existing conditions.

The parties stipulated

before the Industrial Commission that the applicant in this case,
Terry Sandstrom, had a 20% permanent partial imoairment to his
back from all causes, of which 10% was attributable to preexisting conditions and 10% was attributable to the industrial
injury which brought the applicant before the Commission (R. 39, 43).
The plaintiff, at hearing and in a motion for review before the
Tndustrial Commission, preserved the issue of its entitlement to
reimbursement for monies expended in temporary total compensation
dnd medical benefits prior to the aoplicant's stabilization.

The Attorney General's Office,

in

Commission anct the SC'rnnd Injury Funct.
(hereinafter "Commission Brief").

n' t'oe Industrial
f

ilcd a hr10f in resoonse

The hr1cf was siqnect by an

Assistant Attorney General and, as will be oointed out later,
raises issues which were not raised in olaintiff's aooeal or
by a cross-appeal.

The Commission Brief asks that this Court

overturn the Commission's findings that Utah Code Ann.,
§

35-1-99 (statute of limitations provision) does not anply to

claims against the Second Injury Funct.
Thus, the Commission is asking this Court to overturn the
Commission's own findings.

Later, a Respondents' Brief' was

filed on behalf of the Second Injury Fund only

(hereinafter

"Second Injury Fund Brief") asking that the order of the
Industrial Commission be affirmed.
Plaintiffs are now in a position to reoly.
ARGUMENT I
REPLY TO THE POSITION OF T!IE INDUSTRIAL C0MMISSION,
The Commission Brief misinterprets all of the anolicable law
from this Court on the Second Injury Fund and raises issues not
properly raised in this appeal.

The Statement of Facts contained

in the Commission Brief is confusinq and inaccurate.

There was

a settlement agreement entered into by the State Insurance Funn.
Second Injury Fund, and Mr. Sandstrom agreeinq that Mr. Sandstrom
-2-

suffered permanent partial disability of 20%, 10% of which
was attributable to the industrial accident for which plaintiff
was liable, and 10% which was attributable to pre-existing
conditions

(conditions which in this case resulted from prior

industrial accidents which were not CQlllPensated or were not
actionable at the time the claim was brought)
212).
§

(R. 39, 43, 95,

The claim in the Commission Brief that Utah Code Ann.,

35-1-99 should be applied to bar claims against the Second

Injury Fund is an issue neither preserved in motion for review
nor in a petition for a writ of review before this Court, and
should be disregarded.
The argument in the Commission Brief that the order of
the Commission is supported by substantial evidence clearly shows
a lack of understanding of the claims of plaintiffs on aPoeal.
The cases cited in the Commission Brief (p. 4) all address the
scope of this Court's review of findings of the Industrial
Commission.

Plaintiffs are not claiming here that the findings

of fact of the Industrial Commission are without substantial
evidence in the record.

Rather, plaintiffs' claim is that

the Commission misapplied the statutory language of Utah Code
Ann.,

§

35-1-69

(1953, as amended 1981).

'!'herefore, that

argument in the Commission's Brief goes to no issue before
this Court.
The second argument in the ComMission's Brief is the

,"'I y

argument going to the merits of this appeal, and clearly
-3-

takes this Court to task for irnproncrly rcwritinq thP law
regarding the Second In1ury Funrl.

It is verv aoparent from

reading the interpretations given in the

Brief

to the cases, beginning with McPhie v. United States Steel Co.,
551 P.2d 504

(Utah 1976) and Intermountain Health Care

Inc. v.

Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) applying the Second In1ury
Fund law in this State, that the respondents disagree with this
Court's application of Utah Code Ann.,

§

35-1-69.

Describing

that line of cases, the Corrunission Brief states:
One of the severe changes was in giving reimbursement to the insurance carrier for medical
expenses and temporary total disability
compensation.
(Brief, p.

5).

This argument shows an absolute lack of unrlerstand;·

of the underlying reasons for the Second Injury Fund enactment
which this Court has so clearly stated in both McPhie and Orteqa.
Those cases hold that the purpose of the statutory orovisions in
Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69 are to encourage employers to hire
workers with pre-existing incapacities or disabilities.

The

Commission Brief further claims that the legislative intent
behind the 1981 amendments to that Section was to "bring hack
some logic to this direction forced upon the Co1TU'1ission•· (p. 5)
(presumably by this Court) .

This statement clearly ooints out

the present conflict built into the structure of arlrninistration
of the Utah Second Injury Fund, an issue which will be discusseri
later.
The legislative intent argument in the Commission Brief
is an insult to the integrity of the aopellate orocess.
-4-

The

lectures this Court on the intent the Advisory
Cr>uncil for the Industrial Commission had for the 1981 amendrnPnts, but that position has absolutely no support in the
record and no basis in legislative history.
Finally, the Commission Brief argues that settlement was
reached by the parties on July 30, 1983, to which Second Injury
Fund was not made a party.

Provisions of the record cited in

plaintiffs' brief and in the brief of defendant Second Iniury
Fund

(p.

3) clearly show that the applicant, the State Insurance

Fund, and the Second Injury Fund were all parties to the settlement, and both the Second Injury Fund and the Stnte Insurance
Fund knew that the issue of reimbursement for temporary total
compensation and medical benefits was an issue being preserved
for the appeal process.

The settlement orovided that the

applicant could be paid what he was clearly entitled to be
paid under the statutory provisions, and the rights of the
employer to reimbursement would not hamper the applicant's
right to compensation.

Again, this respondent's clear

misunderstanding of the record adds nothing but confusion to
the matter before this Court.
ARGUMENT II
THE POSITION OF DEFENDANT SECOND INJURY FUND
FAILS TO PRESERVE THE UNDERLYING LFr,ISLATIVE
INTENT OF UTAH CODE ANN., § 35-1-69.
-5-

The 1981 amendments to Utah Code

..

§

35-1-69 are shown

in Appendix A to the Second In1ury Fund's brief, and the first
three paragraphs are set out here for the Court's convenience.
35-1-69.
Combined injuries resultinq
in permanent incapacity - Payment out of
second injury fund - Training of employee.
(1) If any employee who has Previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental in1ury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial
injury for which either compensation and or medical
care, or both, is provided by this title that
results in permanent incapacity which is
substantially greater than he would have incurred
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity,
or which aggravates or is aggravated by such
pre-existing incapacity, compensation
medical
care, wn±en-med±eai-eare and other related items
are as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be
awarded on the basis of the combined in1uries,
but the liability of the employer for such
compensation and medical care, and other related
items shall be for the industrial injury only
and the remainder shall be Paid out of the
special second injury fund provided for in section
35-1-68(1)
£ttndll.

For purposes of this section, (a) anv
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease
or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical
care, and other related items shall be awarded
on the basis of the combined injuries as Provided
above, provided, however, that (b) where there
is no such aggravation, no award for combined
injuries shall be made unless the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable
to the industrial injury is 10% or greater
and the percentage of Permanent Physical
impairment resulting from all causes and
-6-

including the industrial in1ury,
is greater than 20%. Where the ore-existing
incapacity referred to in subsection (1) (b)
of this section previously has been compensated
for, in whole or in oart, as a oermanent oartial
disability under this act or the Utah Occuoational
Disease Disability Law, such comoensation shall
be deducted from the liability assessed to the
second injury fund under this oaragraoh.
Where the payment of temporary cUsability
benefits, medical exoenses, or other related
items are required as a result of the industrial
injury subject to this section, the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be responsible for
all such temporary benefits, medical care, or
other related items up to the end of the neriod
of temporary total disability resulting from
the industrial injury.
Any allocation of
disability benefits, medical care, or other
related items following such oeriod shall he
made between the employer or its insurer and the
second in1ury fund as orovided for herein, and
any payments made by the employer or its insurance
carrier in excess of its oroPortionate share
shall be recoverable at the time of the award
for combined d.isabilities if any is made
hereunder.
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the plain meaning of
the first paragraoh of this orovision controls interpretation of
the remainder of the Section.

After defining what a pre-existing

in1ury is in the first Paragraph, the leqislation goes on to
state:
the liability of the employer for such
compensation, medical care, and other
related items shall be for the industrial
injury only and the remainder shall be .
paid out of the second injury fund Provided
for in Section 35-1-68 (1) (emohasis added).
-7-

The plain meaning of that section must be read as conqruent
with the plain meaning of the third paragraph, relied unon
by the Second Injury Fund, which states:
Where the payment of temporary disability
benefits, medical expenses or other related
items are required as a result of the industrial
injury subject to this section, the employer or
its insurance carrier shall be responsible For
all such temporary benefits, medical care, or
other related items up to the end of the period
of temporary total disability resulting from
the industrial injury.
Any allocation or disability
benefits, medical care, or other related items
following such a period shall be made between
the employer or its insurer and the second injury
fund as provided herein, and any Payments made
by the employer or its insurance carrier in
excess of its proportionate share shall be
recoverable at the time of the award ror combined
disability if any is made hereunder (emphasis
added).
As stated in plaintiff's earlier brief, the Plain meaning of
this language is that the employer and insurance carrier are in
no way liable for funds expended for temporary total compensation,
medical expenses, permanent partial disability, or other related
items which are not a result of the industrial in1ury.

Therefore,

for the provision that the carrier be responsible to the end of
the period of temporary total disability to make sense in the
context of the section, it must be interpreted as requiring the
employer or its insurance carrier to pay the aPplicant's medical
expenses and benefits upon which to live, but

the Proviso

that once the determination of combined disability is made, the
employer is allowed to recover that percentage of amounts oair
-8-

in temporary total compensation and medical benefits that are
not attributable to the industrial injury.

Not only does this

interpretation provide a consistent reading of all the language
cJf

the section, but it clearly meets the underlying purcose of

the statute to spread the risk among all employers of hiring
or retaining workers with pre-existing conditions.

Clearly, the

more significant a pre-existing condition, the more risk an employer
has that subsequent aggravation will result in an extensive period
of temporary total disability and more costly medical care.

To

say as does the Second Injury Fund, that it is the Plain meaning
of the statutory language that such risks should be borne by
employer rather than apread broadly through the Second Injury
Fund is to ignore the underlying purpose of the statute.
Before the enactment of the 1981 a!'lendrnents there was
incentive for employers and their insurance carriers to deny
liability where it appeared that a significant amount of the
disability was a result of some pre-existing condition.

Such

a denial meant the applicant did not receive benefits, even though
all parties recognized that the applicant was due the comoensation.
Plaintiffs' interpret the Legislature's intent in changing Utah
Code Ann.,

§

35-1-69 to require that the employer mRke payments

during the initial period of disability and/or receive reimbursement for amounts not attributable to the industrial injury.

Such

interpretation is more congruent with the underlying purpose
of the statute than the interpretation urged by the Second Injury
F' 11nrl.

-9-

Finally, the Second Iniury Fund's hriPf relies on statenents
made during the Senate debate on the bill which resulteri in all
of the changes cited above to Section 6Q.

The Seconrl Iniurv

Fund brief emphasizes comments maoe by Senator Cornahy stating
that the purpose of the bill was "to nore equitably allocate the
compensation for workmen's injuries between the funn anr the
insurance companies."

In Appendix B attached to the Second Iniun

Fund brief, a transcript of the entire proceeding is contained,
and Senator Cornaby goes on to state:
It is a fairly technical item,
it is fairly straightforward.
any questions, I would be glad
respond to them, if not I call
question.

but I think
If there are
to try to
for the

(See Second Injury Fund Brief, Apoendix B, p. 2).

An examination

of the entire amendatory language made to Section 69 bv the
1981 Legislature reveals the second paragraph of Section 69 was
revised in great detail to define situations where pre-existing
injury, disease, or congenital problems should be deemed to
make an applicant's impairment "substantially qreater".

That

paragraph's definition of what is to be rletermined "substantially
greater" is of major impact on the allocation of benefits
between employers and the Second Injury Fund, and does appear to
be a highly technical amendment as Senator Cornaby innicated
in the transcript of the debate on the Senate floor.
-10-

There

was no indication, however, in any of the debate cited in the
Senate argument which would show a desire on the Part of the
f,pg

is la ture to change the underlying purpose of the statute.

l!owcver,

the interpretation of the amendments made by the

Corrunission placing the entire burden for the initial period
of total disability and attendant medical expenses on the
employer substantially alters the underlying purpose of the
provisions of Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69.
ARGUMENT I II
FAILURE OF THE COMMISSION TO .Zl_WARD RFIMBURSEMENT
TO THE PLAINTIFFS WAS PROMPTED BY BIAS AND WAS
A DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL
HEARING.
This Court has long held that all parties before the
Corrunission are entitled to a fair and impartial hearing, See
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
66 U.

600 245 P.

343, 346

(1926).

Recently this Court held

that in order for the Second In1ury Fund to be protected,
it should have notice of actions affecting the Fund, a right
to present evidence, and the right to object to findings of the
Cor.imission; Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 420 (Utah 1982).
Because Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-68, 69

(1953, as amended 1981)

provides for a "Fund" to be administered by the Commission, the
Commission is able to decide on an interpretation of the applirable statutes and impose that interpretation on both the
::.idministration of the fund and the adjudication of claims against
-11-

the fund.

In order for this Court to give effect to the language

in Paoli, li.:_, at 422 stating:
To implement the legislative intent as we have
interpreted and applied it, the Second In1urv
Fund needs to have independent
direction within the Industrial Commission
from some official not responsible for the
adjudicative functions of the Commission
that "direct its distribution",
the Commission's interpretation of the statutory Provisions
governing the Fund should be strictly scrutinized; or this Court
should declare that the Commission's conflict between administratioc
of the Fund and adjudication of its liability denies other parties
appearing before the Commission due process of law and eaual
protection of the laws provided for in both the Constitution of
the United States, Amendment V and XIV(81) and the Constitution of
Utah, Article 1,

§§

7 and 24.

During a Period of time when the

Utah State Insurance Fund was administered bv the Commission,
this Court ref used to order they be separated to afford oarties
a fair and impartial hearing; Ellis v. Industrial Commission,
91 U. 432 64 P.2d 363 (Utah 1937).

However, during the time

such structure existed this Court found that the Utah State
Insurance Fund was not a legally cognizable entity and could
not prosecute an action to contest a Commission award; See
Ban & Kariya Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 U. 301, 247 P.
490 (1926).
-12-

Justice Straub, citing Ban & Kariya approvingly, pointed
out the difficulty when the Col'lmission has adjudicatory Power
'Jver

an entity it administers:
The fund itself is under the exclusive
management and control of the commission.
It is given power to make and it makes all
contracts with respect thereto, including the
issuing of all policies of insurance payable
out of the fund.
The commissioner has what
is called a manager of the fund and a claim
adjuster who are apoointed bv the commission
and who are subject to the
control
and direction of the commission.
It, among
other things, is the dutv of the manaqer and
the claim adjuster to investigate all. alleged
claims for compensation payable out of "The
State Insurance Fund" and to report the result
of their investigation to the commission, and,
if in their judgment the claim is unmeritorious,
to resist its payment; and, where aoplications
for compensation are made oayable out of the
state insurance fund, the commission employs,
and here employed, counsel to represent "The
State Insurance Fund" to resist payment of
the claim.
Counsel so employed also like the
manager and claim adjuster are subject to the
control and direction of the commission .
I refer to such proceedings as I have only
for the purpose of showing that, whenever a
tribunal, whether a judge, court, board, or
other body, sits in judgment in a cause or
controversy in which it is either directly or
indirectly interested, and where it employs
counsel to resist the claim, it is but natural
for it as triers of fact to look with more
or less favor to what is adduced or represented
in harmony with its interests, and with more
or less scrutinv or disfavor to what is adduced
or represented against such interests or at least
is ant to do so.
I do not say such is the case
in all instances, for there may be instances
where a judge, court, board, or other body so
situated and being conscious of the situation,
may be
1 uenced to "lean backwards"; and it may
be that in some instances the board may have
made awards payable out of the state insurance
fund when the making of them may have been
doubtful or even unwarranted .
-13-

That such conditions or situation has a
natural tendency and is calculated to affect
and influence a consideration of evidence
may not well be doubted; and for such and other
reasons it is the qeneral rule that no tribunal
ought or is per1'1itted to sit in iudqment in
any case or controversy in which it is either
directly or indirectly interested.
But, as
heretofore indicated, it is not the fault of
the commission that it in such cases so sits
in judgment.
Under the statute it is required
to do so.
Nevertheless, because the commission,
in a case involving the state insurance fund
over which it has the exclusive manaqement
and control and in effect is a contracting party
every time it writes an insurance policy payable
out of the state insurance fund, and whatever
award is made is payable out of such fund, so
is required to sit in judgment, demands, as I
think, a closer scrutiny and consideration of
its findings and of the evidence than in other
cases where it is not so interested and not a
party to the cause (emphasis added) .
Hawser v. Industrial Commission, 296 P.
in dissent).

780, 786-87

(1931)

(cited

Justice Straub in Hawser clearly points out the

difficulty created when the adjudicator of a claim has administrati
control over the fund which the claim is against.

Emo loyers

their compensation carriers are equally concerned today over
administration of the Second Injury Fund by the Commission.
very least the Court should do is hold the Commission's interpre-

tation of statutes involving the Second Iniury Fund under the light
of strict scrutiny.

The more appropriate solution to quarantee

that applicants, employer and compensation insurers are afforded
an impartial, unbiased hearinq of their cause or defense is to
declare that for the Commission to adjudicate compensation
claims and also administer a fund against which claims are
-14-

3sserted is to deny all parties their rights to due process
,,f

law and equal protection of the laws, and to require the

Legislature to devise a structure that avoids such bias.
CONCLUSION
The 1981 amendments to Utah Code Ann., § 35-1-69, clearly
intended to provide that an applicant is paid temporary total
compensation while that applicant is undergoing the initial
healing period, and to also determine that his medical payments
are paid during that period of time.

However, the Legislature

also intended in those amendments to make certain that the
employer pays up to, but not exceeding, its fair share of all
temporary total compensation, medical benefits, permanent
partial disability, and is entitled to recover any amounts
paid in excess of that during any neriod of time.

Such an

interpretation of those amendments clearly nrotects the
applicant's rights, and also promotes the purpose of this
statute to encourage employers to hire and retain individuals
with pre-existing conditions.
Failure of the Utah State Industrial Commission to
interpret these amendments in this manner and to award
reimbursement to the Utah State Insurance Fund from the
Second Injury Fund for one-half of Mr. Sandstrom's temporary

-15-

total compensation and medical benefits paid to the Cl.ate
of stabilization is clearly a misapplication of the law in
this case.

It was done because of its bias in favor of the

Second Injury Fund and in direct denial of the employer's and
State Insurance Fund's right to a fair and impartial hearing
on this issue.
For these reasons this Court should reverse the Industrial
Corrunission's order disallowing reimbursement to the enployer
for temporary total compensation and medical benefits paid prior
to Mr. Sandstrom's stabilization, but which were attributable to
Mr. Sandstrom's pre-existing injuries.
DATED

day of February, 1984.
BLACK & MOORE
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